Skyscrapers are urbanism in the extreme, but they have received surprisingly little direct attention in urban economics. The standard urban model emphasizes differentials in access across locations, which determine land price differentials and building heights. This explanation leaves out an important force that appears to have historically influenced skyscraper construction: an inherent value placed on being the tallest. In this paper, we present a game-theoretic model of skyscraper development that captures this additional force.
Introduction
Skyscrapers are urbanism in the extreme, but they have received surprisingly little direct attention in urban economics. Typically, these very tall buildings are treated as being one of many phenomena explained by the standard urban model (Alonso [1] , Mills [13] , and Muth [15] ). As Mills [13] (pp 197-199) puts it,
It is not unusual for land values to vary by a factor of from ten to one hundred within a distance of ten or twenty miles in a large metropolitan area. And the tremendous variation in capital-land ratios -from skyscrapers and high-rise apartments downtown to single story factories and single family homes on two-acre lots in the suburbs -is the market's response to those dramatic variations in relative factor
prices.
Thus, skyscrapers are seen as manifestations of the fundamental tradeoffs of land economics, with differentials in access across locations determining land price differentials, which in turn determine building heights differentials.
However, tall buildings have never been about economy alone, at least in the narrow sense discussed above. Ever since the development of the first skyscrapers, the actions and statements of builders suggest that building height has importance in and of itself, beyond the pro forma attribution of value to saleable or leaseable space. One dimension of building height that appears to have been important to builders is relative height. Five-and-dime entrepreneur F.W. Woolworth revised the plans for his eponymous New York City building to ensure that it was larger than the Metropolitan Life Building, and so the largest in the world at the time, save for the unoccupied Eiffel Tower. The Manhattan Company Building (40 Wall Street) was planned to be the largest in the world. It was, if only for the brief period prior to the vertex being added to the Chrysler Building. This secret addition to his building's height allowed Walter Chrysler to achieve his ambition of developing the world's tallest building. Unlike the Manhattan Company Building, the Chrysler Building was taller than the Eiffel Tower, and so was tallest on every list. The Chrysler Building's place at the top of the tallest-buildings list was also short-lived. The Empire State Building initially had five floors added to its planned height to top the Chrysler Building, but this gave it the lead by only four feet. Given the lengths to which Chrysler had gone to top the Manhattan Company Building, such a slim margin was not enough. Consequently, a dirigible mooring mast was added to the Empire State Building, putting it at the top of the list of tallestbuildings for forty years. In all these instances, it seems clear that builders assigned value to being tallest that was independent of the narrow value of a skyscraper as a piece of real estate.
Placing value on being tallest was not a phenomenon confined to the boom years of This paper carries out a game-theoretic analysis of such a skyscraper contest. A builder is assumed to have a payoff function that depends in part on profits, as derived from a standard model of urban spatial structure. Builder payoff also depends on whether the builder has developed the tallest structure in his or her market. The paper considers both simultaneous-and sequential-move skyscraper games.
The main conclusion that emerges from the analysis is that the contest results in dissipation, with the value of the tallest-building prize at least partially lost in the poor economics of skyscrapers. In the simultaneous-move version of the game, all but the highestvalue builder gain no expected value whatsoever from competing in the skyscraper contest.
Although the highest-value builder does enjoy positive expected surplus from the contest, there is partial expected dissipation of the fruits of victory for this builder as well. This sort of race is at least broadly consistent with the historical evidence sketched above. In a sequential version of the game, the dissipation takes the form of costly pre-emption, where the leader builds a tall-enough building to deter competitors. This pre-emption also seems to be consistent with observation, in particular with the Empire State Building's long stay at the top of the tallest-building list.
These results are relevant to several significant issues in urban economics. First, they bear on agglomeration in that skyscrapers allow the concentration of great numbers of workers and businesses in very close proximity. It is well-known that in the presence of positive externalities associated with agglomeration, there exists a tendency for density to be inefficiently low in the market equilibrium. The results of our analysis of skyscraper contests suggest that an opposing tendency may exist to build at excessive densities. Second, the results also bear on the related issues of the health of central cities and so-called "urban sprawl." Opponents of sprawl argue that the tendency to decentralize spatially is inefficiently strong in equilibrium since suburbanites and exurbanites do not bear the full costs of commuting or decentralized public good and service provision. The skyscraper contest results suggest an opposing tendency, one that tends towards a more centralized urban spatial structure. Third, the results bear on the tendency towards overbuilding in real estate markets. Overbuilding has been identified as an important aspect of real estate cycles in nearly every city. It has been variously attributed to irrationality on the parts of builders and lenders, to incentive problems in banking, and to particular features of tax codes. This paper's results suggest another possible foundation, one arising from strategic interactions between builders.
In carrying out a game-theoretic analysis of skyscrapers, the paper fills an important gap in the urban economics literature. As noted above, the typical way to explain skyscrapers has been to consider them in the context of the standard model. There has been almost no work that has isolated skyscrapers as being important in their own right. One exception is Grimaud [7] , who considers the relationship of building heights to agglomeration economies in a model of spatial interactions. Another is Sullivan (1991) , who
shows that the low cost of vertical transportation by an elevator can encourage the construction of tall buildings even on cheap land. Helsley and Strange [9] also employ a model of spatial interactions. They show that skyscrapers can be seen as a second-best internalization of agglomeration externalities. There is no paper in the urban economics literature that considers the implications of rivalry among builders of tall buildings.
The paper also builds also on work in game theory. The contest that we consider is a kind of all-pay auction. Builders expend resources (which is like bidding for an object) and the highest bidder wins (like winning the auction). Unlike the most common auction forms, however, all bidders pay what they have bid, even the losers. The all-pay auction under complete information is considered by Moulin [14] and Baye et al [4] . It has been applied previously to political lobbying (Baye et al [3] ) and to the arms race (O'Neill [16] ). To the best of our knowledge, skyscraper contests have never been mentioned previously as instances of all-pay auctions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a history of skyscraper development, establishing the importance to builders of being tallest. Section III specifies and solves a version of the standard model of spatial structure that is suitable to considering skyscrapers. Section IV sets out and solves a sequential model of a skyscraper development. Section V analyzes skyscrapers through a simultaneous-move game. Section VI concludes.
II. A brief history of skyscrapers

A. Tall buildings in pre-industrial times: masonry and monuments
This section will selectively review the history of tall buildings, focusing on the identification of contests between rival builders. For much of recorded history, the world's tallest building has been the Great Pyramid of Giza. It is difficult to think of a better illustration of the importance that builders can assign to a building's size. It is also difficult to think of a better illustration of the limits of masonry construction. Given the building technology of the ancient period, the higher levels of a pyramid become narrower and narrower, while the lower levels must be very large in order to support what will rise above them.
The Great Pyramid remained the world's tallest building until the middle-ages, when it was supplanted by a series of cathedrals. Again, it is easy to understand the inherent importance of size. It is worth noting that this importance is not limited to being biggest in the world. Importance was also placed on a simple church steeple being the tallest building in a town or city, and so being closest to God.
At the conclusion of the era of masonry construction, the tallest building in the world was the Washington Monument (1884 -1889). It remains the tallest free-standing stone structure in the world. As world's tallest, it was supplanted by the Eiffel Tower (1889), whose height was made possible by structural steel.
B. Early skyscrapers
None of the structures mentioned thus far were built for human habitation. It is easy to understand why. As discussed above, as a masonry building grows taller, the loads borne by lower floors require wider and wider walls. This means less usable space. In addition, the need to walk up to higher floors means lower rents, further reducing the marginal revenue associated with building height. Structural steel allowed building height to grow without increasingly wide exterior walls. Put simply, Woolworth assigned value to being tallest that was independent of the narrow value of the skyscraper as a piece of real estate. As will be seen below, this situation is one that has repeated itself several times, with builders assigning value to being biggest and so topping each other with structures of undeniable symbolic significance but doubtful economy.
C. The great skyscraper race
Dakota and Toronto's CN Tower. It has been common to refer to the world's tallest building with the qualification about occupation being understood. Unless otherwise noted, we will follow this convention. prestige is assigned to being tall.
All of this suggests several general patterns characterizing skyscraper contests. First, builders assign value to being tallest, and there are situations where there are contests among builders. Second, the contests are sometimes resolved when one participant builds at a pre-emptive height that thus deters successive builders from further building-height competition.
Third, building at great height has frequently proven to be uneconomical. Later in the paper, we will specify and solve game-theoretic models that are consistent with these patterns.
Before doing this, however, we will set out the place of skyscrapers in standard urban economic analysis.
III. Skyscrapers in the standard urban model
A. Overview
This section will examine the place of skyscrapers in the standard urban model associated with Alonso [1] , Mills [13] , and Muth [15] . This approach solves simultaneously for land rent, the rent on structural space the spatial structure of a city. The aspect of spatial structure of concern here is building height or, equivalently, the ratio of capital to land in the production of space. The key determinant of this is factor prices. Since the price of capital is not thought to vary much within a city, the price of land is decisive.
B. Model
The model begins by considering rents, which are derived from the profits earned by land users. We will refer to these land users as tenants. In our model, tenants are identical business service producers, broadly conceived. Each is assumed to occupy one unit of building space. We normalize this to equal one floor of a building. We consider a discrete location space where the location of a tenant, or, more precisely, the location of the building in which the tenant rents space, is denoted by i = 1,2,...N. For simplicity, we do not consider the labor demands of tenants.
A tenant's output is given by the increasing and concave production function q(K). K represents the quality of the city's business environment. As such, it includes the full range of agglomeration economies. Marshall [12] identifies input-sharing, labor market pooling, and knowledge spillovers as aspects of a city that have the potential to augment productivity.
treat K as being fixed, but it is obviously possible to endogenize K by supposing it to be determined by the individual contributions made by tenants. See Helsley and Strange [9] for one approach to endogenizing K.
Tenants incur a location-specific cost of obtaining K and thus interacting with the city's other businesses. We suppose that the interaction cost for a tenant at location i is given by t i . Locations are ranked by accessibility, so t 1 < t 2 < t 3 and so on. The price of tenant output is p. Under these assumptions, the profit of a tenant at location i is
where r i denotes the rent per unit space (per floor) at location i.
The market for space is competitive. Bidding for land must therefore ensure that the profits of tenants are the same at every location, with 0 denoting the common level. The bid-rent for floor-space at location i is therefore equal to
There is one unit of land at each location. Each location is owned by a builder, also indexed by i. The profit in the next-best use of a builder's land is for simplicity assumed to equal zero. If a builder chooses to put up a building, height (equivalent to density) will be chosen to maximize profits. The profit of builder i is
where c(-) is the cost of construction. We suppose c(-) to be increasing and convex, giving a concave profit function. It is worth pointing out that revenues may decline with height at an increasing rate. As a building grows taller, the elevator and stair systems take up a greater fraction of the building's footprint, reducing the amount of saleable space. This tends to reinforce the concavity of the profit function.
The profit-maximizing building height for location i satisfies Since output increases in K, building height increases in K at all locations. Differences in heights across locations will be driven by differences in accessibility, broadly conceived. A corollary to the obvious result (b) is that locations with similar access characteristics two (e.g., lots that are nearby) should be built to similar heights in equilibrium.
Composing h i * into the expression for builder profit defines the firm's maximum profit i * = (h i *). Since output increases in K, builder profit increases in K at all locations.
Since the locations are ranked by accessibility, builder profit decreases in i. The extent of development is determined as follows. For all developed sites, we must have i * 0. Since i * is decreasing in i, the last occupied location I will have the property that I * 0 and I+1 * < 0. The set of occupied locations will be larger the larger is K.
Throughout this paper, we treat the price of output, p, as given. It is worth discussing an alternative specification. Suppose that business services are consumed locally, with tenants facing a downward sloping demand function p(Q), where Q is the aggregate output of all firms, given by A corollary to the second prediction is that when it is efficient to build a very large structure at one point in time, it should be efficient to build a very large structure slightly later. This corollary also fails to be consistent with observation. In the relatively brief era of 
IV. A strategic analysis of skyscrapers
A. Primitives
This section will specify and solve a simple game of skyscraper development. In order to focus on the strategic issues, we begin by considering a situation where there are only two builders. We assume them to be risk-neutral. The two builders are denoted i = 1,2. 4 As reported in the New York Times [17] . 5 The number of floors for the Manhattan Company Building (currently the Trump Building) is reported as 70 (Emporis) and 72 (Trump Building website). This presumably reflects changes to the internal configuration of the building.
Each owns a site and chooses building height. As above, we suppose that the indexes are chosen so that builder 1's location offers better access. Thus, under the standard model we would have h 1 * > h 2 *. Unlike the standard model, we now assume that there is an exogenous value v > 0 associated with constructing the tallest building in the market.
Formally, we suppose that the payoff to builder i is:
where is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the builder's skyscraper is strictly tallest and equal to 0 otherwise. In this setup, there is a contest among builders. This is consistent with Section III, which presented extensive evidence that builders attach value to having the tallest structure in a given market. The market in question in this section's model could be an industry, with value accruing to having a taller building than one's rivals. This seems to have been one relevant aspect of the rivalry between Walter Chrysler and his eponymous building and the Empire State Building, spearheaded by John Raskob and Pierre duPont of General
Motors. The market in question could instead be geographic, with value accruing to having the tallest building in a city, region, nation, or in the entire world.
There are many reasons a premium might be placed on winning the skyscraper contest. First, the premium may be a matter of taste alone. An oversized building is a good match for an oversized ego. Second, a building's stature may serve as advertising. It may make consumers aware of a product, or it may change the image that a product has. These are the sorts of "intangible benefits" that motivated F.W. Woolworth, as noted in Section II. Returning to the standard model, this assumption is equivalent to assuming that access is similar for the properties owned by rival builders.
B. A simple sequential game
We will consider several ways that a skyscraper contest might be specified. It is natural to begin with a particularly simple sequential game. Specifically, we suppose for now that builders choose h i sequentially, with builder 1 choosing first. There is no possibility of waiting.
The next result characterizes the solution of this simple game:
Proposition 2. If two builders choose heights sequentially, with builder 1 choosing first, then the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is for builder 1 to pre-empt (h 1 = h 2 P ) and for builder 2 to concede (h 2 = h 2 *). 6 In the specification where p is endogenous, the maximizing choice of each builder depends on the choice of the rival. Denoting this best response by h i * (h j ), the condition that defines the pre-emption height becomes v + i (h i P ) = i (h i * (h i P )). The analysis and basic results of this section are essentially unchanged in this case. by the definition of h 1 *. The pre-emption is therefore dissipative. In order to win the contest, the winning builder overbuilds relative to the profit-maximizing level. In the case where the two builders are identical, the result is even stronger. When h 1 P = h 2 P , both the winner and loser earn i (h i *) as in the v = 0 situation. In this case, dissipation is complete. It is worth noting that our model is, in a sense, biased against dissipation since it does not allow for the price of space to be negatively impacted by overbuilding.
We believe that the simple race model captures forces that the standard model does not. It thus helps to explain some otherwise puzzling patterns of skyscraper construction.
The existence of a tallest building premium allows for significant differences in the heights of nearby buildings. It also allows for long periods of pre-emption, where one building is sufficiently tall that construction of taller buildings is discouraged. The model is also consistent with tall buildings being built in medium-sized cities if the premium for being tallest is large enough. Finally, and probably most importantly, the race model is consistent with the common observation that skyscrapers have tenuous economics. The nature of a skyscraper contest is that victory is always Pyrrhic, at least in a narrow economic sense.
These results extend readily to a situation where there are many builders moving in inverse order of access. By pre-empting builder 2, builder 1 automatically pre-empts all the other builders. The results do not extend to changes in move order. Suppose that there are only two builders and that the high-type builder moves second. In this case, the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is for builder 2 to begin the game by choosing h 2 = h 2 * and for builder 1 to respond by building a slightly taller building. In this case builder 1 (the second mover), receives the entire surplus. This shows that the game has a second-mover advantage.
It also shows that the dissipation result requires pre-emption.
This suggests that the crucial question is whether a builder typically anticipates Taipei 101 was completed, there were already plans for other tall buildings, possibly taller. It seems clear that no builder can safely assume that his or her building is the last one to be built, thus allowing for cheap pre-emption. Builders face strong potential competition, and this presumably impacts any pre-emptive strategies that they pursue. Our sense, therefore, is that the simple game where the highest-type builder moves first is more reasonable than one where the highest-type builder moves last because it captures potential competition. Even so, given these complications, it seems advisable to consider a model where results do not depend on move order. The next section does this by considering a simultaneous-move game.
V. A model of a skyscraper race
A. Basics
One aspect of the previous section's solutions that seems at odds with evidence is that the skyscraper contest features one builder pre-empting and the other (or others) conceding.
In the case of the NY race of the 1920s and 1930s and the current Asian situation, the evidence suggests a race where many builders actively compete for the prize. In this section, we will consider a simultaneous-move game which will have this feature.
Suppose that the game is as above with the modification that builders choose heights simultaneously. It can be readily seen that the equilibrium with pre-emption described above (h 1 = h 2 P and h 2 = h 2 *) is not a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game.
While builder 2's choice to concede is a best-response to builder 1's choice of the preemptive height, builder 1's choice is not a best response. Instead builder 1 would be better off choosing h 1 *. The next result generalizes this.
Proposition 3: The simultaneous move game has no equilibrium in pure strategies as long as builder 2 is not blockaded, that is, so long as h 2 P > h 1 *.
Proof: Suppose not, so there exists a pure strategy equilibrium (h 1 ,h 2 ). It must always be the Thus, there can be no pure strategy equilibrium with h 1 = h 2 . QED.
Intuitively, there can be no pure strategy equilibrium because either the winner would like to win more cheaply or the loser would be unwilling to incur the costs of building a tall building without the prospect of winning. 7 7 See Moulin [14] and Baye et al [4] for parallel results for all-pay auctions.
B. Mixed strategy equilibrium
In order to find the equilibrium with simultaneous choices, we therefore consider mixed strategies. This seems to be appropriate given the nature of the skyscraper contest. It is clear from Section II's discussion of revised and re-revised plans that a builder was never completely certain how high rival buildings would go. In addition, there were many credible announcements of new contenders for the world's tallest building. Particularly notable among these was the Metropolitan Life Company, which began construction of a building that was slated to rise to 100 stories, and thus could potentially have denied the Empire State The basic characteristic of a mixed strategy equilibrium is that each player must be indifferent among all pure strategies that it plays with positive probability. Let the cumulative distribution function i (h) denote the probability that builder i chooses a building height less than or equal to h. For builder 1 the indifference requirement means that
for all h H 1 . k 1 is a positive constant equal to builder 1's payoff for playing any pure strategy in its support, which is denoted by H 1 Intuitively, the left side of (5.1) is the probability that builder 1 wins the contest when choosing h 1 times the value of the prize plus the economic value of the building. The complication of this and all mixed strategies is that this probability depends on the randomization chosen by the other player, captured in (5.1) by
for all h H 2. k 2 is a positive constant equal to builder 2's payoff for playing any pure strategy in its support, H 2 .
The following result characterizes the mixed strategy equilibrium of the skyscraper game. Proof: See the Appendix.
The mixed strategy equilibrium has several key features. The first is that, as in the sequential games considered above, skyscraper construction is dissipative. In equilibrium, builder 2 places positive probability weight on h 2 *. This implies that the expected payoff for builder 2 is equal to 2 (h 2 *). Builder 2 is thus no better off in expected payoff than in the absence of the prize. The expected payoff of builder 1 equals the probability that builder 2 plays h 2 * times the value of the prize, plus 1 (h 1 *). Thus, the expected payoff of builder 1 rises by less than the amount of the prize. Together, these results establish the robustness of our earlier result that in a race skyscraper construction is likely to be uneconomical.
The second key feature of the mixed strategy equilibrium is that, unlike the sequential games, there is active participation by both builders. This is unlike the sequential games where builder 2 effectively conceded the prize in response to pre-emption by builder 1. This simultaneous game thus resembles the skyscraper races discussed in Section II. As with the sequential game, the simultaneous game can explain phenomena that are unaccounted for in the standard urban model. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, nearby buildings need not be similar in height, there is no guarantee of a tight relationship between city size and the height of the tallest building, and tall buildings may be uneconomical.
C. Overbuilding
One especially notable feature of the mixed strategy equilibrium is the existence of overbuilding. Since neither builder places any probability weight on heights less than h* i , expected building height must exceed the profit maximizing building height in the mixed strategy equilibrium. This "overbuilding" is easy to characterize when the builders and lots are identical. Let (h) denote the common profit function of a builder under these conditions. where (h i ) > 0 by the concavity of (h). Expected building height is
Integrating by parts, using the definition of h P and rearranging terms yields: which generates the equilibrium function:
is increasing in I. This means that, for any h i , the equilibrium strategy places more probability weight below h i as I increases. Intuitively, as I increases, the probability that any height wins the contest decreases, and so each builder reduces his equilibrium "bid" or height. Expected building height in this case can be written:
where the integrand is just the distribution function j (h i ). Since j (h i ) is increasing in I, it must also be the case that E[h] is decreasing in I. In fact, in the limit as I approaches infinity, j (h i ) approaches 1 for all h i , and so the expected building height approaches h*. In this sense, competition discourages overbuilding in a skyscraper contest. This analysis is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5: The mixed-strategy equilibrium features overbuilding: expected building height exceeds the profit maximizing building height for each active builder. When builders and lots are identical, the degree of overbuilding decreases as the number of active builders rises.
Proof: see above.
Our analysis suggests that contests to build tall buildings result in the construction of buildings that are, in a probabilistic sense, too large. Most of the discussion in the paper has been concerned with the most notorious of these contests, the building of the world's tallest structure. It is important to recognize that the phenomenon of building tall to win a prize is more general than that in several ways. First, as noted above, there are many markets in which it is possible to be biggest. A web search by geography or use or both will reveal that building owners find it worth advertising their buildings' positions at the top of lists of tallest in various categories. Second, there may be value in being among the tallest in some market without necessarily being the tallest.
VI. Conclusion
This paper has considered the game-theoretics of a contest between rival builders of Proof: The first step is to characterize the supports for the probability distributions. It is easy to see that builder i would not place positive probability on any height below h i *.
Furthermore, builder 2 will place no probability on any height in the interval (h 2 *, h 1 *) because in this region builder 2 loses for sure and earns a lower payoff than at h 2 *. In addition, neither builder would place positive probability on any height greater than h 2 P . played with positive probability in a mixed strategy equilibrium.
There can also be no atoms at the common upper bound of the supports, h 2 P . If builder 1 had an atom at h 2 P , then there would exist an -neighborhood below h 2 P where builder 2 would do better by reallocating probability to h 2 *. This gap would imply that builder 1 would not want to play h 2 P with positive probability. If builder 2 had an atom at h 2 P , there would be an -neighborhood below h 2 P where builder 1 would do better by reallocating probability to slightly above h 2 P because of the discontinuity in the probability of winning.
Finally, neither builder can place strictly positive probability on h 1 *. For builder 2, doing so would be dominated by h 2 *. For builder 1, an atom at h 1 * would encourage builder 2 to place an atom at a slightly greater height, which has been ruled out above.
To complete the solution, we must solve for the constants k 1 and k 2 from (5.1) and (5.2). First, note that there must be a probability mass at h 2 * for builder 2. Suppose not.
Without a probability mass at h 2 *, k 1 = 1 (h 1 *). However, builder 1 could instead play a pure strategy of h 2 P , which would earn a strictly greater payoff. It is thus necessary that there be a probability mass at h 2 *. Since builder 2 loses with certainty at height h 2 *, this implies that k 2 This completes the characterization of the mixed strategy equilibrium.
Figure 1. Pre-emptive building height
